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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
 
Summary 
 
 
The Court held that the district court abused its discretion when overturning a 
misdemeanor driving under the influence conviction by failing to consider the state’s evidence of 
the defendant’s guilt.  
 
Background 
 
 Schneider exercised her right to a trial in justice court for a charge of misdemeanor 
driving under the influence, after a bench trial, the judge found her guilty. Before any argument 
could be heard as to sentencing, the judge ordered Schneider be remanded into custody to serve 
an additional day in jail because she only had one day of credit for time served. Schneider argued 
that the automatic remand was a penalty for exercising her right to a trial. The judge responded 
that the remand was in accords to the departmental policies and procedures.  
Schneider appealed the conviction to the district court, contending that her conviction 
was not supported by sufficient evidence and that her sentencing was unconstitutional because it 
was based upon a policy to discourage defendants from exercising their right to a trial. The 
district court concluded that there was no error in the trial or issue with the merits of the case, but 
the policy violated Schneider’s due process right to a fair trial. Accordingly, the district court 
reversed Schneider’s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. The State filed a writ 
petition arguing that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its determinations.  
 
Discussion 
  
 First, an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion exists when a court’s decision was 
based on preference rather than evidence of established law.2 The Court has recognized that a 
judge is biased when “the judge has closed his or her mind to the presentation of all the 
evidence.”3 More importantly, an individual “may not be punished for exercising a protected 
statutory or constitutional right.”4 The district court found that the justice court was biased 
because the justice court had closed its mind to the issue of sentencing by predetermining a 
sentence of two days in custody before hearing any arguments. Accordingly, the Court 
determined that the district court did not exercise its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously because 
the district court’s decision was based on established law and the record before it. 
 Second, a reversal is warranted when judicial misconduct interferes with the right to a 
fair trial.5 There was no showing that the bias toward Schneider at sentencing interfered with her 
fair trial right as the record did not reveal any error in the determination of Schneider’s guilt 
                                                        
1  By Ping Chang. 
2  State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 931–32, 267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011). 
3  Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998). 
4  United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982). 
5  Kinna v. State, 84 Nev. 642, 647, 447 P.2d 32, 35 (1968). 
from the trial evidence. Therefore, the Court concluded that the district court arbitrarily and 
capriciously exercised its discretion to reverse Schneider’s conviction.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the justice court was 
biased against Schneider at sentencing. However, the district court’s decision to reverse 
Schneider’s conviction and remand for a new trial was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the 
Court issued a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to strike the portion of its order 
that reversed Schneider’s conviction.  
